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Although legal sanctions are often non-deterrent, we frequently observe compliance with 
‘mild laws’. A possible explanation is that the incentives to comply are shaped not only by 
legal, but also by social sanctions. This paper employs a novel experimental approach to study 
the link between legal and social norm enforcement. We analyze whether the two institutions 
are complements or substitutes. Our results show that legal sanctions partially crowd out 
social norm enforcement. The welfare effect from mild laws is positive, however, as a higher 
level of compliance is achieved at lower enforcement costs. 
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Societies have come up with laws to regulate many situations in economic and societal life where
individual and social interests are in conﬂict (environmental laws, tax laws, etc.). While these laws
are usually backed by legal sanctions, potential oﬀenders often face rather low detection risks and
relatively mild sanctions. Legal norm enforcement is then non-deterrent, in the sense that rational
individuals with reasonable degrees of risk aversion should be expected to deviate from the law.
Nevertheless, we frequently observe widespread compliance with ‘mild laws’.1 One explanation
put forward by legal scholars is that the incentive to comply with the law not only derives from
formal law enforcement, but also “from the informal enforcement of social mores by acquaintances,
bystanders, trading partners, and others” (Ellickson 1998, p.540). Traxler and Winter (2009)
provide survey evidence which supports this reasoning. They show that a substantial fraction of
the population is willing to impose sanctions (disapproval or social exclusion) on individuals who
are, e.g., drunk driving, fare dodging or cheating on taxes. The importance of such decentralized,
social sanctions for the enforcement of compliance is documented in a rapidly growing body of
literature.2 However, a key question is still left unanswered by this literature: how does formal
law enforcement aﬀect the informal enforcement of norms? Are these two enforcement institutions
substitutes or complements, i.e., do centralized legal sanctions crowd out or crowd in decentralized
social sanctions?
Ideally, these questions would be studied in a natural environment. As the introduction of or
the change in legal regulations is typically endogenous, it is quite diﬃcult to identify the causal
link between legal and social norm enforcement from ﬁeld data. Moreover, there are obvious
constraints in the measurement of social sanctions. To avoid these empirical limitations, our
study builds on a simple and parsimonious laboratory experiment. This allows us to assess our
research questions in a controlled environment. In the experiment, subjects in groups of four play a
one-shot public-goods game in which they face a voluntary-contribution mechanism. Our baseline
treatment (Base) captures a situation in which only social sanctioning is possible while legal
sanctions are absent. Players observe each others’ contributions to the public good and can assign
1See, e.g., Becker (2007) on tax evasion and Cohen (2000) on the enforcement of environmental regulations. A
general discussion is provided by Tyran and Feld (2006) and Galbiati and Vertova (2008a).
2Seminal experimental studies are Fehr and G¨ achter (2000), Masclet et al. (2003). For a law and economics
treatment of social sanctions, see Posner (2000). For a theoretical contribution, see e.g., Rege (2004).
1costly punishment points which reduce the payoﬀ of the punished player (Fehr and G¨ achter 2002,
Herrmann et al. 2008). In addition to these decentralized sanctions, the second treatment (Law)
introduces legal sanctions. The law imposes sanctions on deviations from the socially optimal
contribution level. More speciﬁcally, players are randomly monitored after their contribution and
sanctioning decisions. A player who is detected contributing less than the social optimum is ﬁned
by a central punishment authority – independently of any social sanctions incurred. Comparing
subjects’ sanctioning behavior between the two treatments then allows us to analyze the impact
of centralized sanctions on social norm enforcement in a controlled set-up.
The impact of legal on social sanctions can be decomposed into a direct and an indirect eﬀect,
where the latter is linked to the actual compliance level. Presumably, compliance, i.e., the level of
individuals’ contributions, is sensitive to the treatment conditions: one might expect contributions
to be higher when subjects face the risk of social versus the risk of social cum legal sanctions.
As a consequence, diﬀerences in punishment choices might be due to the change in contributions
rather than the introduction of legal sanctions per se. To disentangle direct and indirect treatment
eﬀects, we developed a method in the spirit of Selten’s (1967) strategy method. In particular, we
implement a novel strategy method at the punishment stage of the public-goods game.3 After
their contribution choice, players are confronted with a series of diﬀerent triples of other group
members’ contributions. One of these triples covers the others’ actual contributions, while the
remaining ones are hypothetical situations. Subjects have to make punishment decisions in each
situation, knowing that only the decisions for the actual contribution triple will be payoﬀ-relevant
(of course, without knowing which one this actually is).
This new method has several advantages. First of all, it assures that contribution situations are
virtually constant between treatments. Keeping constant others’ contributions, we can measure
the direct impact of legal sanctions on individuals’ sanctioning behavior. Second, we observe
a series of individual punishment decisions for truly exogenous contributions rather than single
punishment choices that follow endogenous contribution choices. Exposing players to randomly
varied contribution triples, we can also analyze the causal eﬀect of others’ contribution levels and
composition (e.g., facing a group of one high and two low contributions as compared to three
intermediate contributions) on the extent of punishment.
3Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and G¨ achter (2009) use strategy methods at the contribution stage
of public good games. For a related application in prisoners’ dilemma-experiments, see Falk et al. (2005).
2Our experiment points out several results. First of all, comparing the punishment behavior in
treatment Base to previous studies on decentralized punishment reassures that our novel strategy-
method approach does not aﬀect or bias subjects’ behavior in a systematic, unpredicted way. In
line with the existing literature, we observe that a large fraction of the population engages in
decentralized norm enforcement. Typically, subjects sanction those individuals who contribute
less than themselves, with the sanctioning intensity increasing in the diﬀerence in contributions.
Moreover, our data reveal that the punishment incurred by an individual crucially depends on the
contributions of the other group members. Everything else being equal, individuals assign stricter
sanctions to a free-rider the higher the contributions of the unaﬀected players in the group are.
This pattern of social norm enforcement is prevalent in both treatments. In the Law treatment,
however, decentralized sanctioning is signiﬁcantly less intense: the presence of legal sanctions par-
tially crowds out the social norm enforcement. The decline in sanctions is particularly pronounced
when the diﬀerence between the punisher’s and punishee’s contribution is large. Our data further
show that actual contributions are nevertheless higher in the Law treatment. The combination of
legal and social sanctions thus produces more pro-social behavior than the decentralized enforce-
ment on its own. As long as the centralized enforcement system comes at reasonable costs, the
increase in cooperation is achieved at lower overall costs of legal and social sanctioning. Compared
to an ‘archaic world’ where only decentralized punishment is possible, the introduction of mild
laws might thus give rise to substantial welfare gains.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to present clear-cut evidence on the interaction
of legal and social sanctions. While the importance of the interplay between the two sanctioning
institutions is generally acknowledged among lawyers and economists, practitioners and theorists
likewise (Ellickson 1998, Falk et al. 2005, Meares et al. 2004), up to now both have only been
studied in isolation. Decentralized sanctions are discussed in a large body of mainly experimental
literature, showing that many subjects are willing to forego personal proﬁts to punish anti-social
behavior.4 Although social sanctions help to overcome the free-rider problem, an increased level
of cooperation is usually accompanied by signiﬁcant eﬃciency losses caused by the cost of social
sanctioning (at least in the short run; see G¨ achter et al. 2008).
4See, e.g., Fehr and G¨ achter (2000, 2002), Masclet et al. (2003), G¨ urerk et al. (2006), Carpenter (2007),
Nikiforakis and Normann (2008).
3A diﬀerent strand of experimental research considers centralized sanctions in isolation. Car-
denas et al. (2000), Tyran and Feld (2006), Galbiati and Vertova (2008a, 2008b), H¨ orisch and
Strassmair (2008), and Kosfeld et al. (2009) explore if, when, and why legal sanctions inﬂuence
compliance. Similarly, studies of tax evasion in the lab consider auditing and centralized ﬁnes
(see, e.g., Alm and McKee, 2006, Fortin et al., 2007). In line with economic theory, they typically
ﬁnd that strong (deterrent) centralized sanctions are eﬀective in enforcing compliance – in partic-
ular, if they emerge endogenously via, e.g., voting. Galbiati and Vertova demonstrate that even
non-deterrent sanctions might foster compliance. Their results suggest that mild laws serve as
coordination devices, shaping beliefs about others’ behavior and hence the degree of cooperation
in the short run. However, Galbiati and Vertova (2008a) also show that mild laws per se are not
suﬃcient to establish norm-compliance in the long run. Our study, which is the ﬁrst to combine
the analysis of centralized and decentralized sanctioning, suggests that the combination of social
and mild legal sanctions – as proposed by Ellickson (1998) – might be successful in achieving
compliance with mild laws.
2 The Experiment
To assess the impact of legal on social sanctions, we consider a situation with scope for social norm
enforcement. Players are randomly matched into groups of n = 4 and play a public-goods game
at stage I. Each player i ∈ {1::4} has to decide how many tokens ci of his initial endowment
E = 20 to contribute to a joint project (the public good), and how many to keep for himself.
Each token allocated to the public good increases the payoﬀ of each player in the group by ci,
with the marginal per capita return  = 0:4. The primary individual payoﬀ I





i =@ci = −1+ < 0, each player has the dominant strategy to free-ride
on others’ contributions. The unique Nash equilibrium therefore is to keep the entire endowment
E. However, since 1=n < , it is socially optimal if all players contribute their entire endowment
to the public good. Players thus face a social dilemma: individuals’ and group’s interests are in
conﬂict and free-riding can be considered as anti-social behavior. Society may want to regulate the
dilemma by establishing a centralized norm enforcement institution (‘law’, ‘police’), that imposes
sanctions on free-riders. In addition, sanctions may also be imposed in a decentralized way.
4To account for centralized and decentralized sanctioning institutions, we add two additional
stages to the game. At stage II, players observe each others’ contributions and can then decide to
impose social sanctions by assigning up to 10 punishment points to each player. Each punishment
point dij costs the punisher i one token, while at the same time it reduces the punished player j’s




j̸=i dij − 
∑
j̸=i dji (with  = 1 and  = 3). In this situation, social sanctions
constitute a second-order public good. While everyone would be better of if free-riding were
credibly sanctioned (such that the social ﬁrst-best is achieved without any actual punishment),
individually each player has a dominant strategy not to invest in sanctioning at stage II. To see
why, let us assume that at stage I all players would anticipate to be sanctioned if ci < E, and
that they expect a sanctioning pattern to be such that @(I
i + II
i )=@ci < 0. Rational players
would then choose ci = E. However, the corresponding beliefs cannot be part of a Baysian Nash
equilibrium, since @II
i =@dij = − < 0.
Finally, at stage III, legal sanctions are implemented as a stochastic payoﬀ. A player is
monitored with a ﬁxed probability p = 1=8. In this case, he faces a ﬁne which is proportional to
the deviation from the contribution level that is prescribed by the law, L = E = 20, such that his
expected payoﬀ from stage III becomes III
i = −ps(L − ci), with s = 1:2. The expected payoﬀ
from all three stages is given by
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Our choice of parameters implies that legal sanctions in isolation are ‘non-deterrent’, in the
sense that contributing zero is still the dominant (expected payoﬀ-maximizing) strategy: @(I
i +
III
i )=@ci = −1 +  + ps < 0. Our design therefore provides a scenario in which social sanctions
can potentially help to achieve compliance with a mild law.
Note that we implement a sequence where social sanctions are applied before potential legal
sanctions take place. This sequence not only appears to be natural for many situations (consider,
for instance, the case where a partner learns about the spouse’s income tax evasion before the
tax authorities do). One might also argue that it is a harder test for observing an interaction
between legal and social sanctions. If crowding eﬀects occur in the sequence implemented here,
5we conjecture the eﬀect to be even stronger if we used the opposite order. The conﬁrmation of
the hypothesis is left for future research.
Treatments The experiment implements two treatment conditions. Treatment Base consists
of stages I and II only. Hence, free-riders only face the threat of social sanctions. In treatment
Law, we additionally include the third stage with legal sanctions. Comparing behavior between
these two treatments allows us to observe individuals’ sanctioning behavior dij in the presence
and absence of legal sanctions. As noted earlier, individual sanctioning decisions are measured




l}, t ∈ [1;11] (with the subindices j ̸= i, k ̸= i, l ̸= i denoting the other subjects’
hypothetical contributions). The order of these triples is randomized for each subject. One
of the triples covers the actual contributions of the other players in the matching group. The
remaining ten triples are hypothetical combinations of contributions, each being randomly drawn
from a pre-deﬁned set of combinations.5 For each contribution triple, subjects have to decide
how many punishment points (if any) they want to allocate; knowing that 10 out of the 11
situations are hypothetical. It is also common knowledge that only the decisions made in the
actual contribution-triple are payoﬀ-relevant – without knowing which one is the ‘real’ triple,
of course. In this way, we collect data from 3 × 11 sanctioning choices for each subject.The
procedure assures that the hypothetical contribution situations are exogenous and orthogonal to
our treatments. By comparing the punishment decisions between Law and Base made for the
ten hypothetical cases, we can therefore identify the ceteris paribus impact of the legal system on
individuals’ social sanctioning behavior (i.e., keeping constant the other player’s contributions).
Predictions Let us now discuss diﬀerent predictions regarding the treatment’s impact on
social sanctioning. The benchmark for the rational (and risk-neutral) self-interested player is
straightforward. As illustrated above, social norm enforcement is a second-order public good and
standard theory predicts zero sanctioning in both treatments. Given the overwhelming empirical
evidence, however, we know that subjects do make use of their punishment option (see Nikiforakis
5The following procedure was used. First, we deﬁned three sets of contributions (low, intermediate and high):
c
L 2 f0;:::;4g, c
M 2 f5;:::;15g, c
H 2 f16;:::;20g. Within each of the combinations, fcL; cL; cLg, fcL; cL; cMg,
fcL; cL; cHg, fcL; cM; cMg, fcL; cM; cHg, fcL; cH; cHg, fcM; cM; cMg, fcM; cM; cHg, fcM; cH; cHg, fcH; cH; cHg, we randomly gen-




Appendix I). E.g., a subject might face f0;2;3g for the combination fc
L;c
L;c




Another subject might face f1;3;3g for the former and f0;2;14g for the latter. If the set f0;2;14g, by chance, did
correspond to the real triple, the subject would not face this situation, but instead another one of the pre-deﬁned
contribution triples for fc
L;c
L;c
Mg would be randomly selected.
6and Normann 2008 for a recent survey). Social-preference models, surveyed in Fehr and Schmidt
(2006), are able to account for this behavior. These models, in particular the consequentialist
theories, predict that the introduction of legal sanctions crowd out social sanctions.
The intuition behind this prediction is best illustrated within the framework of inequality aver-
sion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999), where punishment is motivated by the disadvantageous inequality
experienced by the punisher. Legal sanctions clearly reduce the payoﬀ inequality that a compliant
contributor i (ci = 20) experiences with respect to a free-rider j (cj = 0). Without legal sanc-
tions the diﬀerence in I would be ci − cj = 20 token; with legal sanctions, the expected gap in
(I + III) equals (ci − cj)(1 − ps) = 17 token.6 By mitigating the payoﬀ inequality that arises
from free-riding, the centralized sanctions reduce the extent of decentralized sanctions imposed
by an inequality-averse player. Hence, legal sanctions should partially replace social sanctions.
A diﬀerent strand of literature has emphasized the role of emotions, in particular anger, in
motivating individuals’ sanctioning behavior (Bosman and van Winden 2002, Hopfensitz and
Reuben 2009). Along these lines, the introduction of the legal system could also crowd out social
punishment, if the anticipation of legal sanctions reduces the punisher’s emotional drive to impose
social sanctions on the free-rider. One might argue, however, that the strategy method used in
our approach alters the subjects’ emotional states and induces more ‘cold’ decision making at the
sanctioning stage. We might therefore observe a lower level of punishment than in the case of
unconditional punishment decisions.7 As we apply the strategy method in all treatments, this
should not have an impact on treatment diﬀerences.
Finally, one can derive an alternative prediction regarding the treatment eﬀect from legal
theories. In particular, expressive theories of law (Cooter 1998, McAdams 2000) suggest that
the introduction of a legal system will shape player’s perceptions on what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’
conduct. In turn, we should observe that players coordinate on imposing more sanctions on those
who more clearly deviate from the legal norm, L = 20. Legal sanctions should therefore crowd in
social sanctions for low contribution levels.
6Trautmann (2009) explores the case of inequality aversion under risky payoﬀs. Following the proof of propo-





j 2 [1;20] is given by dij = (c

i   cj)(1   ps)= (where  captures the exogenous distribution of preference
types and the punishment costs  and ). Hence, social sanctions are decreasing in ps. Note that this observation
applies to any of the multiple equilibria that can emerge.
7Note that a number of studies (e.g., Brandts and Charness 2000) did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in behavior
between strategy and direct response methods in other contexts.
7Implementation The computerized experiments (using z-Tree; Fischbacher 2007) were run in
March 2009 in Bonn. 96 students from all majors were randomly recruited (using Orsee; Greiner
2004) and participated in one of two treatment sequences. In Sequence 1, subjects ﬁrst played
the Base treatment and afterwards played the Law treatment. The other sequence reversed the
order, i.e., subjects ﬁrst played Law and then Base (Sequence 2).8 After subjects arrived in the
lab, they were randomly and anonymously allocated into matching groups. Subjects then received
a written copy of the instructions for the ﬁrst treatment. Additionally, in order to create common
knowledge about the instructions, we read them out aloud. The instructions and the information
on the computer screens were written in a neutral language, omitting words like punishment,
sanctions, or law to avoid framing and demand eﬀects. Before the experiment started, subjects
had to answer a set of control questions to make sure that they understood the rules of the game.9
After they ﬁnished the ﬁrst treatment, subjects were told that they would now participate in a
second treatment. They did not receive any feedback about their payoﬀs or the others’ actual
contribution choices from the ﬁrst treatment. After playing the alternative treatment, which
followed the same procedure as before, subjects received feedback about the outcomes of both
treatments. Thereafter, they had to ﬁll out a short questionnaire asking, e.g., for socio-economic
data. An entire session lasted approximately 60 minutes. Subjects were paid according to their
cumulated period payoﬀs at a rate of 20 Cent per tokens. Participants earned about 13 Euros on
average, including a show-up fee of four Euros.
3 Results
This section presents the results from the experiment. Our main focus is on the impact of legal on
social sanctions. Moreover, we analyze cooperation and the overall welfare eﬀect from mild laws.
We ﬁrst present the ﬁndings from the between-subject comparison. These results are corroborated
by the within-subject comparison, which is presented thereafter.
8Sequence 1 captures the introduction of a mild law into a society which is initially governed by decentralized
norm enforcement. Sequence 2 starts from a situation with legal and social norm enforcement and then removes
the centralized enforcement institution.
9Two subjects, one in each treatment, had substantial problems understanding the game. They repeatedly failed
to answer the control questions. As we did not want to embarrass them in front of the other students, we let them
take part in the experiment but excluded their data from the analysis. This can be further motivated by the fact
that the two assigned 635% (444%) more punishment points than the median (average) of the remaining subjects.
The results presented in the following section are robust to excluding the two groups of the two ‘drop-out’ subjects.
83.1 Between-subject comparison
Legal and social sanctions First, we consider the direct impact of legal on social sanctions.
Below we will show that subjects’ actual contributions are endogenous to our treatment conditions.
To identify the direct treatment eﬀect, we therefore focus on subjects’ punishment decisions for
the 10 hypothetical contribution triples.10 As these triples are – in expectation terms – the same
between treatments, we can assess the direct impact from the treatment manipulation, i.e., holding
constant the contributions that the punishers face.
In line with the existing literature discussed above, we observe a substantial amount of social
sanctions. Figure 1 displays the sanctioning pattern by comparing the mean amount of punishment
(on the vertical axis) for diﬀerent gaps ci − cj in public-good contributions between punisher i
and punishee j (horizontal axis). The ﬁgure reveals that sanctions are literally social in both
treatments, in the sense that they are mainly targeted at free-riders: subjects impose sanctions
on those players who contributed less than they themselves did, with the sanctioning intensity
increasing in the inequality in contributions. In contrast, anti-social punishment (see Herrmann
et al. 2008), i.e., sanctions targeted at contributors where ci − cj < 0, is rarely observed in either
treatment (which is why Figure 1 groups those observations in the bar for (−2;−20]). As is clearly
visible from Figure 1, social sanctioning is less intense in Law than in Base. While the treatment
eﬀect is small for minor ‘oﬀenses’, the decline in sanctions is particularly pronounced when the
diﬀerence between ci and cj is large, i.e., when the degree of ‘non-compliance’ – and thus the
expected legal sanction – is high. This provides some ﬁrst, indicative evidence that legal sanctions
tend to crowd out social sanctions.
Averaging over all players and all hypothetical situations, the number of assigned punishment
points dij is 18% lower in Law than in Base, dropping from :84 down to :69 points. However, a
non-parametric test reveals no signiﬁcant diﬀerence (rank-sum test, comparing the mean number
of punishment points assigned over all hypothetical situations per subject, p = 0:528, two-sided).
The reason is likely to be that those observations with small diﬀerences ci − cj, where there is
hardly any punishment in either treatment, are substantially over-represented. Put diﬀerently,
averaging over all contribution situations neglects that punishment choices and the treatment
eﬀect seems to depend, among other things, on the gap in i and j’s contributions. In order to
10More precisely, this subsection focuses on the punishment decision for the 10 hypothetical contribution triples of
the ﬁrst part of the experiment. Including the real contribution triple does not change any of the following results.
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control for ci and cj, we conduct a regression analysis. Making use of the panel structure of our
data (recall that for each subject we observe 3 × 10 sanctioning decisions for exogenous triples)
and accounting for 0 ≤ dij ≤ 10, we estimate a random-eﬀects Tobit model. Since each subject
faced diﬀerent contribution triples in a random order, we also control for the sequence of triples
(t). Furthermore, we also control for the (hypothetical) contributions of the other, unaﬀected,
group members (ck;l = (ck + cl)=2).
Estimation results are presented in Table 1. The speciﬁcation from Column (1) replicates the
non-parametric test result. The treatment on its own does not reach statistical signiﬁcance (even
with a control for potential sequence eﬀects). Test statistics indicate a very poor performance
of this ﬁrst estimation: the null hypothesis that all regressors are equal to zero cannot be re-
jected (p = 0:284), suggesting that the speciﬁcation is missing crucial explanatory variables. The
picture changes substantially once we account for the gap in the punisher’s and the punishee’s
(hypothetical) contributions, ci−cj. Column (2) shows a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of this gap. The
positive coeﬃcient indicates that subjects impose more punishment points the larger the diﬀerence
between the own and the other’s contribution.11 At the same time, the estimated treatment ef-
11We also considered diﬀerent speciﬁcations, e.g., using ci and cj as separate regressors, or using j’s deviation
from the group’s minimum contribution or from the group’s mean contribution as benchmarks. The estimation
of these models delivers results that are very similar to those reported here. In particular, ci   cj seems to be
quantitatively the most important predictor of the punishment decisions.
10Table 1: Random-eﬀects Tobit regression: Marginal eﬀects on social sanctions
Dependent variable: dij
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Law -0.097 -0.279* -0.284* -0.275*
(0.158) (0.148) (0.149) (0.151)
ci − cj 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.067***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)




t -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log-likelihood -3057 -2443 -2428 -2428
Observations 2820 2820 2820 2820
Notes: The table displays the marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean (conditional on being uncensored)
from random eﬀects Tobit regressions. The dependent variable is the number of punishment points
assigned from i to j, dij. The sample covers all punishment choices for hypothetical triples in the initial
treatment. The treatment dummy Law equals unity in treatment Law and zero otherwise. Variable ci cj
measures the gap between punisher’s and punishee’s contributions. Variable ck;l = (ck + cl)=2 measures
the average (hypothetical) contribution of the two other, unaﬀected, group members. t depicts the
sequence of triples. Estimation output for the constant is omitted and standard errors are in parentheses.
Level of signiﬁcance: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
fect becomes signiﬁcant at a 10%-level. Moreover, the log-likelihood of the speciﬁcation increases
dramatically. In Column (3) we additionally account for the mean contribution of the other two
group members. Again, we obtain a signiﬁcantly negative estimate for the treatment eﬀect that
is close to the 5%-level. Hence, including legal sanctions reduces the extent of social sanctions.
The estimates suggest that individuals on average allocate 0.28 punishment points less when a
mild law is in place. To compare the eﬀect size, note that free-riding by one additional token (a
ceteris paribus decline in cj of one token) increases the sanctioning that player i imposes on j by
only 0.06 points. This indicates that the decline in social sanctioning in the Law treatment is
non-negligible. Furthermore, note that there is a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect from ck;l. Keeping
contributions of players i and j ﬁxed, an increase in average contributions of the unaﬀected group
members thus results in stronger sanctions for player j. Quantitatively, however, the contribu-
tion level of ck;l is substantially less important for the punishment choice of i than the direct
comparison between ci and cj.
11Speciﬁcation (4) explores whether there is an interaction between the treatment dummy and
the extent of free-riding, (ci − cj) × LAW. The estimation clearly neglects this conjecture. This
means that the decentralized punishment of free-riding on the margin, i.e., the amount of sanctions
that player i imposes on j if the latter reduces cj by one unit, remains constant between treatments.
While marginal social sanctions remain constant, adding the legal sanctions in treatment Law,
increases the expected marginal punishment by ps (see equation 1). The marginal overall sanctions
– social cum legal – are thus higher in Law than in Base. This suggest that, despite a partial
crowding out of decentralized punishment by centralized sanctions, there are stronger incentives
for cooperation under the mild law.12
Summarizing the ﬁrst set of results on the direct impact of legal on social sanctions, we have
found a negative treatment eﬀect from LAW. The presence of the legal system reduces individ-
uals’ sanctioning behavior. Legal norm enforcement replaces rather than reinforces social norm
enforcement. This ﬁnding is in line with predictions stemming from social-preference models, but
it conﬂicts with expressive theories of law. It is important to note, however, that in the simple
game situation at hand, it is quite salient what is socially desirable and what is undesirable. One
might conjecture to ﬁnd support for expressive theories of law in more complicated environments.
Regarding the composition of the other group members’ contributions, we ﬁnd that (i) j is pun-
ished less the more he contributes and (ii) is punished more, the more i contributes; and (iii) j
is punished more in a group of high contributors than in a group of low contributors. The last
observation implies that contributions trigger a negative externality on other group members’
payoﬀs at the punishment stage of the game, as they ceteris paribus increase the magnitude of
sanctions incurred for a given contribution level.
Contributions The next interesting step is to see how subjects’ contribution decisions are
aﬀected by the introduction of non-deterrent legal sanctions. Figure 2 shows a box-plot of in-
dividuals’ contribution to the public good. In treatment Base, where only social sanctions are
possible, the mean contribution level is 11.8 (median: 12). In treatment Law, where legal and
social sanctions are eﬀective, the mean is 15.1 (median: 17). The increase in contributions of 28%
12All these results (as well as those presented in Table 3 below) are robust when we control for self-reported risk
attitudes and other individual characteristics (e.g., age, gender, etc.) – none of which turn out to be signiﬁcant.
The same holds true for the treatment eﬀect on contributions reported below. The data suggest that risk-aversion
neither has a direct impact on contributions nor is there any interaction with the treatment: highly risk-averse and
close to risk-neutral subjects respond similarly to the Law treatment.
12is highly signiﬁcant (rank-sum test, p = 0:0098, two-sided). This treatment eﬀect extends the
results from Galbiati and Vertova (2008a, 2008b). They show that a mild law on its own increases
cooperation signiﬁcantly. Our ﬁndings demonstrate that the eﬀect is robust when the mild law is

























The observation that contributions increase in Law is important. It reveals that the combina-
tion of centralized and decentralized sanctioning institutions is successful in enforcing cooperation
– despite the crowding out of social sanctions. Since our study was designed to analyze the im-
pact of legal on social sanctions, we cannot exactly identify the reasons for the strong increase
of subjects’ contribution in Law. In contrast to Galbiati and Vertova, who highlighted the coor-
dination function of mild laws, our results point to steeper incentives from punishment. Recall
that the marginal social cum legal sanction that is imposed for free-riding is higher in treatment
Law than in Base. In fact, the point estimates from Table 1 suggest that the expected payoﬀ
impact from free-riding is positive in treatment Base, but slightly negative in Law. Based on
our parameter choices and the marginal eﬀects from Table 1 (i.e., evaluated at the mean and
conditional on being uncensored), we get @(I
i + II




i )=@ci = −1++(n−1)0:06+ps = 0:09. Hence, contributing zero would still be
13the expected payoﬀ-maximizing strategy in Base (although with a very small payoﬀ advantage),
but not in Law. This underlines that a society which manages to establish a mild law together
with decentralized norm enforcement can arrive at a successful institutional setup. While Galbiati
and Vertova (2008a) have found that mild legal sanctions per se fail to maintain high contributions
in a repeated game, our results suggest that the combination of legal cum social sanctions should
be more eﬀective. It is due to future research to test this conjecture.
Welfare eﬀect So far we have shown that the Law treatment partially crowds out social
sanctions and that it increases the actual level of cooperation at the contribution-stage. To assess
the overall welfare-impact of the treatment, we have to consider the realized legal sanctions as
well as the decentralized sanctioning behavior for the actual contribution triple. In line with the
above results, the data show a substantial crowding out eﬀect in the punishment decisions for
the actual contribution triples as well. The mean number of punishment points assigned declines
from 0.71 in Base to 0.30 in Law. This drop of 57% is signiﬁcant at the 5%-level (rank-sum test,
p = 0:031, two-sided). The pronounced diﬀerence is driven by two eﬀects. On the one hand, the
direct crowding out eﬀect that we demonstrated above leads to a reduction in social punishment –
even when we keep the others’ contributions constant. On the other hand, there is now an indirect
eﬀect as contribution levels are higher in Law than in Base. Since higher contributions lead to
lower punishment, we observe a further decline in social sanctioning. This also implies that the
actual welfare gain from introducing legal sanctions is larger than suggested by the analysis of the
direct eﬀect.
Mean Payoﬀ Base Law ∆
Public good, I 27.10 29.08 +7%
Social sanctions, II -8.51 -3.60 −57%
Legal sanctions, III -0.77
Total payoﬀ, Π 18.59 24.65 +33%
Table 2: Payoﬀ comparison between treatments
A summary of the payoﬀ comparison is provided in Table 2. Taking (i) the increase in co-
operation, (ii) the decline in the costs for (giving and receiving) decentralized punishment, as
well as (iii) the costs for (receiving) centralized sanctions together, the mean payoﬀ in treatment
Law increases by 33% (as compared to Base). This comparison does not account for the costs
of the legal system. As long as the mild law can be implemented at reasonable costs, however,
14there is scope for potentially large welfare gains. If, for instance, the social costs for reducing an
individual’s payoﬀs by 1 token were the same if it were via legal or via social sanctions (namely
= = 1=3), the treatment would still achieve a net-welfare gain of 32%.
3.2 Within-subject comparison
Introducing a mild law It seems natural to think of a situation where legal sanctions are
introduced into an environment that features only social sanctions. This exogenous change from
an ‘archaic’ into a ‘modern’ society is captured in the ﬁrst sequence of our experiment.13 In this
sequence, subjects ﬁrst faced treatment Base and subsequently played treatment Law (of course,
without receiving any feedback in-between). This allows for a within-subject analysis of how the
sanctioning behavior reacts to the introduction of a legal system.
As above, we ﬁrst compare the social sanctions for the hypothetical contribution situations in
the two treatments. The left panel of Figure 3 displays the sanctioning pattern in the hypothetical
contribution situations for those subjects who ﬁrst play treatment Base and treatment Law
afterwards. This ﬁgure closely resembles what we have observed above (see Figure 1). The mean
amount of punishment for diﬀerent gaps ci−cj in public-good contributions strongly declines when
the centralized sanctions are introduced. Decentralized punishment drops from :84 down to :70,
the diﬀerence now being highly signiﬁcant in the non-parametric test (sign-rank test, comparing
each subject’s mean amount of punishment in Base to the mean amount in Law, p = 0:0090,
two-sided). Hence, there is again a signiﬁcant crowding out of social sanctions by legal sanctions
in the within-subject comparison, suggesting that the results from the between-comparison are
robust.
The same holds true regarding the analysis of contributions. After the introduction of legal
sanctions, the mean contribution increases from 11.8 to 15.3 (sign-rank test, p ≤ 0:001, two-sided).
Thus, the crowding out of social sanctions is again accompanied by an increase in cooperation. Not
surprisingly, we also observe a substantial decline in the decentralized punishment imposed on the
actual contribution choices (from 2:12 to 1:21; p ≤ 0:001). Consequently, the introduction of a mild
law yields a 28% increase in the average payoﬀ, which coincides qualitatively and quantitatively
with the eﬀects displayed in Table 2.
13On the endogenous formation of institutions, see Tyran and Feld (2006) and Kosfeld et al. (2009).
15Figure 3: Mean Punishment Patterns – Within-Subject Comparison
Removing a legal system Contrary to the introduction of mild laws, one might also ask
how removing an initially existing centralized institution aﬀects decentralized norm enforcement.
Are social sanctioning levels going to remain at modest levels or will they increase again? To
address this question we had subjects play the reversed order, i.e., those who ﬁrst faced treatment
Law subsequently played treatment Base. The punishment behavior for this second sequence is
displayed in the right panel of Figure 3.
In contrast to our previous ﬁndings, we observe only minor changes in social sanctions in
this treatment order. Subjects who started in treatment Law assign 0:69 points on average, and
subsequently 0:53 in treatment Base. The decline is signiﬁcant at a 5%-level (sign-rank test,
p = 0:0112, two-sided). To assess this eﬀect, note ﬁrst that the average punishment in the Law
treatment is virtually identical to the one for the alternative treatment order (0:70 and 0:69 for
Sequence 1 and 2, respectively). However, moving from Law to Base, decentralized punishment
declines even further. Hence, in Sequence 2, social sanctions do not ﬁll the gap which is left
after removing the mild law. This suggests that the crowding out eﬀect (observed in the other
sequence discussed above) spills over from the ﬁrst treatment where a legal system is in place
into the second treatment Base. Once subjects start from a situation where norm enforcement
is partially delegated to a centralized institution, they might be less willing to take over this
role again when it is abolished. G¨ achter et al. (2009) report a similar ﬁnding in the context
of gift-exchange games: exposing workers to explicit performance incentives signiﬁcantly reduces
voluntary cooperation in subsequent trust-contracts – even though explicit incentives have been
16abolished. A comparable eﬀect is also reported in Gneezy and Rustichini’s (2000) famous kinder-
garden experiment. After introducing a monetary ﬁne for late-coming parents, the number of late-
coming parents increased signiﬁcantly. When the ﬁne was removed again, no reduction occurred.
Our results neatly complement these ﬁndings, showing that – for subjects who experience as a
benchmark the case with a legal system – the crowding out of decentralized norm enforcement
persists, even when the centralized norm-enforcement institution is removed. Removing the mild
law thus resulted in a drop in the overall (legal cum social) level of norm enforcement. The
evidence then raises the question to which extent the decline in norm enforcement is also reﬂected
in cooperation levels.
In line with intuition, we indeed observe a decline in cooperation. The average contribution
signiﬁcantly drops after removing the legal sanctioning mechanism, from 15.1 in Law to 13.1 in
Base (sign-rank test, p = 0:0178, two-sided). The resulting decline in the payoﬀ from stage I
is compensated by a smaller amount of social sanctions in Base, such that removing the legal
sanctions has practically no eﬀect on the total payoﬀ (the relative change in average payoﬀ is
0.003%). While the between- as well as the within-subject comparison for Sequence 1 documents
that centralized institutions signiﬁcantly increase payoﬀs, this last ﬁnding suggests that removing
them might not necessarily be harmful to overall welfare. It is up to future research to test the
eﬀects from establishing and then abolishing legal sanctions in a dynamic setup.
Full sample analysis We conclude the section by applying the parametric analysis of the
decentralized punishment choice from above (see Table 1) to our full sample, i.e., including the
data from the ﬁrst as well as the second treatment. The regression analysis conﬁrms and extends
our previous ﬁndings. First, the Law treatment results in a crowding out of social sanctions.
As we pool all our data, the eﬀect is now highly signiﬁcant. At the same time, however, the
direct eﬀect is quantitatively less strong than the one found before. This is mainly driven by the
fact that the between-treatment diﬀerences for the treatments played second are less pronounced.
Second, subject i’s punishment of j is stronger, the larger the diﬀerence in their contributions is,
and the higher the other player’s contributions are. Third, there is no interaction eﬀect between
the treatment and the contribution diﬀerence ci − cj (Column 4). Hence, the crowding out is in
levels rather than on the margin.
17Table 3: Random-eﬀects Tobit regression: Marginal eﬀects on social sanctions
Dependent variable: dij
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Law 0.024 -0.083*** -0.086*** -0.085***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
ci − cj 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.059***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)




t -0.008** -0.005* -0.005* -0.005*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log-likelihood -5633 -4446 -4422 -4422
Observations 5640 5640 5640 5640
Notes: The table displays the marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean (conditional on being uncensored)
from random eﬀects Tobit regressions. The dependent variable is the number of punishment points
assigned from i to j, dij. The sample covers all punishment choices for hypothetical triples in the initial
and the subsequent treatment. All other regressors are as described in Table 1. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Level of signiﬁcance: * p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
4 Concluding discussion
This paper studied the link between centralized and decentralized punishment in a public-goods
game. We developed a novel experimental approach to elicit subjects’ punishment behavior via
the strategy method. This allowed us to identify direct and indirect eﬀects from legal on social
sanctions. Centralized and decentralized norm enforcement turned out to be substitutes in our
experiment: social sanctions were partially crowded-out by legal sanctions. While individuals
imposed less punishment on average, the marginal social cum legal sanctions faced by a free-rider
were higher in the presence of a ‘mild law’. In line with this observation, we found that the legal
sanctions triggered a substantial increase in public-good contributions – despite the crowding out
of decentralized punishment. Thus, a higher level of cooperation was obtained at lower costs
of social sanctioning. Consequently, the implicit delegation of norm enforcement to a formal,
centralized institution allowed for a signiﬁcant increase in overall welfare. The combination of
mild laws and social sanctions therefore appears to be a successful institutional arrangement to
enforce compliance.
18From the perspective of expressive theories of law, our results appear surprising at ﬁrst sight.
One might have conjectured that the introduction of a legal system crowds in social sanctions,
as the law shapes player’s perceptions about what is socially desirable and undesirable. In the
context of our public-goods game, however, it seems that there was little ambiguity about what to
consider ‘good’ and ‘bad’ conduct. Already in the absence of legal sanctions, subjects’ punishment
behavior was clearly targeted at free-riders and we observed hardly any ‘anti-social punishment’.
Hence, there was little scope for the law to serve as a coordination device for punishment. In
future research, it would be interesting to see if one ﬁnds support for expressive theories of law in
more complex environments, where the distinction between pro- and anti-social behavior is less
salient.
While our study establishes the ﬁrst experimental evidence on the interplay of legal and social
norm enforcement, there are several avenues for future research. We observed that the exogenous
shift from an ‘archaic’ society (where only decentralized norm enforcement is possible) towards
a ‘modern’ society (with a formalized enforcement institution) had a clear impact on players’
punishment and contribution choices. In the future, we would like to assess the importance of
the diﬀerent channels that can shape cooperation, i.e., the immediate eﬀect of legal sanctions as
well as the laws eﬀect on subjects’ expectations regarding the other players’ contributions and
sanctions. A promising ﬁrst step in this agenda would rely on an experimental variation of the
‘content’ of the law and its formal enforcement (ﬁnes, sanction risk, etc.). A further important
task is to shed light on the long run eﬀects from the combination of formal and informal norm
enforcement. Will cooperation sustain when legal and social sanctions are available? What if
players are given the possibility to shape these institutions endogenously? Research along these
lines promises to provide valuable insights into the functioning of modern societies and will help
to increase our understanding of eﬀective enforcement institution.
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21Appendix I: Contribution Triplets
In the following, we list the contribution triples that were used within each combination of cL,
cM and cH. Before the experiment, these 10 x 8 triples were randomly generated by sampling
with replacement from the corresponding sets cL, cM, cH. Each player then faced a randomly
selected triple within each combination 1 – 10. If the selected triple correspond, by chance, to the
real triple, the subject would not face this situation, but instead another one of the pre-deﬁned
contribution triples for the corresponding combination.
(1) (cL, cL, cL): (0,0,0), (0,2,3), (1,1,3), (1,2,2), (1,2,3), (1,2,4), (1,3,3), (1,3,4)
(2) (cL, cL, cM): (0,1,5), (0,2,8), (0,2,14), (1,2,10), (1,2,12), (1,3,14), (2,2,6), (2,3,12)
(3) (cL, cL, cH): (0,3,18), (1,2,20), (1,3,19), (1,4,20), (2,2,18), (2,2,19), (3,3,18), (4,4,17)
(4) (cL, cM, cM): (0,9,11), (0,5,12), (0,13,14), (1,10,15), (2,6,8), (2,9,11), (2,10,15), (3,13,14)
(5) (cL, cM, cH): (0,6,19), (0,14,17), (2,6,17), (2,8,20), (2,11,19), (3,7,18), (4,8,17), (4,10,20)
(6) (cL, cH, cH): (0,18,19), (1,19,19), (2,18,19), (2,18,20), (2,19,19), (3,18,20), (3,19,19), (4,19,20)
(7) (cM, cM, cM): (5,7,12), (5,14,16), (6,6,9), (6,10,10), (7,8,9), (7,10,13), (7,14,16), (8,9,11)
(8) (cM, cM, cH): (5,5,17), (5,8,18), (6,11,20), (8,15,17), (9,12,18), (9,15,18), (11,15,19), (12,15,19)
(9) (cM, cH, cH): (5,18,20), (7,18,19), (9,18,20), (11,17,17), (12,17,18), (12,18,18), (14,17,20), (15,17,19)
(10) (cH, cH, cH): (17,17,19), (17,18,19), (17,18,20), (17,19,19), (17,19,20), (18,18,19), (18,18,20), (20,20,20)
Appendix II: Instructions
Reported below.
22THESE ARE THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE GERMAN INSTRUCTIONS FOR TREATMENT LAW. 
INSTRUCTIONS IN TREATMENT BASE WERE IDENTICAL EXCEPT FOR THE PARTS 
CONCERNING THE THIRD STAGE. 
 
 
General explanations to the participants 
 
 
You are now participating in an economic experiment. Today’s experiment consists of more 
than one part, the parts being independent from one another. If you read the following 
explanations carefully, you’ll be able to earn a considerable amount of money – depending on 
your decisions and those of the other participants. Thus, it is important to read these 
instructions very carefully. 
 
The instructions you received are for your private information only. It is absolutely 
prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment. Should 
you have any questions, please ask us. If you violate this rule, you will be dismissed from the 
experiment and forfeit all payments 
 
The experimental payoffs will be calculated in Taler. The total amount of Taler that you have 
accumulated during the experiment will be converted into Euro and paid to you in cash at the 
end of the experiment. You will be informed about the exchange rate from Taler to Euro at 
the beginning of each part of the experiment.  
 
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period, participants are divided into groups of 
four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. In each period, the 
composition of the groups will change. Therefore, participants cannot be identified across 
periods. 
 
Each period consists of 3 stages. On stage 1, you have to decide how many Taler to contribute 
to a project. On stage 2, you learn about the others’ contributions and then have to decide, if, 
resp. by how much, you want to reduce the others’ income from stage 1. On stage 3, a random 
device decides if a participant’s income is reduced further. 
  
 
Detailed information about a period  
 
The first stage: 
 
At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 Taler. We call this his or her 
endowment. Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how 
many of the 20 tokens you want to contribute to a project and how many of them to put on 
your private account.  
 
 
   
 
Income from your private account: 
For each Taler you put on your private account, you earn one Taler. For example, if you put 
20 Taler on your private account (thus contributing zero Taler to the project), you would earn 
20 Taler from your private account. If you, e.g., would contribute 12 Taler to the project (thus 
putting 8 Taler on your private account), your income from the private account would be 8 
Taler. Nobody but you receives Taler from your private account.  
 
Income from the project: 
For each Taler contributed to the project, you (and each other participant in your group) earn 
0.4 Taler. Each participant’s income from the project is thus given by: 
 
Income from the project = Sum of contributions to the project x 0.4 
  
Example: If the sum of contributions would equal 20 Taler (e.g., if you and the other three 
participants in your group would contribute 5 Taler each), you and everyone else in your 
group would receive an income of 20 x 0.4 = 8 Taler from the project. If the sum of 
contributions would equal 10 Taler, you and everyone else in your group would earn 10 x 0.4 
= 4 Taler from the project.  
 
Income at the end of stage 1: 
 
Your income at the end of stage 1 consists of your income from your private account and the 
income from the project: 
 
    
      Income from the private account (= 20 – your contribution)   
  + Income from the project (= 0.4 × sum of contributions to the project)   
      Income at the end of stage 1   
    
 
Let us illustrate how to calculate your income at the end of stage 1 using an example: 
You and the other participants in your group contribute 15 Taler each. The sum of 
contributions thus equals 15+15+15+15=60 Taler. Your income at the end of stage 1 would 
then be given by: 
5 Taler from your private account + 0.4 x 60 Taler from the project = 5 + 24 = 29 Taler 
 
If you would have contributed, e.g., 0 Taler instead, the sum of contributions would equal 
15+15+15+0=45 Taler. Thus, your income at the end of stage 1 would then be given by: 
20 Taler from your private account + 0.4 x 45 Taler from the project = 20 + 18 = 38 Taler 
 
The others’ incomes at the end of stage 1 are calculated accordingly.  
The second stage: 
 
At the beginning of the second stage, you are informed about the contribution decisions of the 
other participants in your group. You can then reduce or leave constant the income from 
stage 1 of each participant in your group. The other participants can also reduce your income 
if they wish to.  
 
In order to reduce the income of a participant, you have to assign points to him. Each point 
assigned reduces the other’s income by 3 Taler. If you assign 1 point, you reduce his or her 
income by 3 Taler. If you assign 2 points, you reduce his or her income by 6 Taler etc. If you 
do not want to change the other’s income, you assign 0 points. 
 
The more points you assign to a participant, the higher is his or her income reduction. At the 
same time, however, each point that you assign reduces your own income as well. Each point 
assigned reduces your own income by 1 Taler. For instance, if you assign 2 points, you reduce 
your own income by 2 Taler. If you assign 4 points, you reduce your own income by 4 Taler; 
if you assign 0 points, you do not incur any costs.  
 
You have to decide for each participant in your group how many points you want to assign to 
him or her. You can assign up to 10 points per participant.  
 
By how much a participant’s income is reduced in total depends on the sum of received 
points. If somebody, for instance, receives 1, 0 and 2 point from the others, his or her income 
will be reduced by (1+0+2) x 3 = 9 Taler. At the same time, the others have to bear the cost 
for assigning points of 1, 0, resp. 2 Taler.  
 
The third stage: 
 
On stage 3, a random device decides if a participant’s income is reduced further. Each 
participant is selected with a probability of 12.5%. In each group, one participant is selected at 
most. (A probability of 12.5% can be illustrated as follows: You throw an 8-sided dice. Your 
income will be further reduced if the dice shows a 1.) 
 
If you are the one who is randomly selected, your income will be reduced by 1.2 times the 
amount you have put on your private account on stage 1. The same holds true for the other 
participants. 
 
For instance, if you contributed 5 Taler on stage 1, thus putting 15 Taler on your private 
account, your income might probably be reduced by 
1.2 x 15 Taler = 18 Taler 
 
For instance, if you contributed 19 Taler on stage 1, thus putting 1 Taler on your private 
account, your income might probably be reduced by 
1.2 x 1 Taler = 1.20 Taler 
 
If you contributed 20 Taler on stage 1, your income will not be reduced at all on stage 3.  
   
 
Consider that the events on stage 3 do not depend on the decisions made on stage 2. That is, 
the probability that one’s income is further reduced is not affected by the number of points 
assigned or received on stage 2. Furthermore, consider that at the time you are assigning 
points on stage 2, you do not know whether the income of a participant will be reduced 
further. Yet, you know the probability with which this is going to happen (namely, 12.5%).  
 
 
Your Period Payoff: 
 
Your payoff in each period is thus given by: 
 
   
      Income from stage 1   
  − Reductions for points received on stage  2   
  − Costs for points assigned to others on stage 2    
  − reductions on stage 3 if you are randomly selected   
     Period Payoff   
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